INTRODUCTION TO
COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS
TRUONG VAN ANH
SAIGON UNIVERSITY
UNIT 2: The nature of cognitive linguistics:
Assumptions and commitments
In this chapter we address the assumptions and commitments that make cognitive linguistics a distinctive enterprise. We begin by outlining two key commitments: ‘Generalization Commitment’ and the ‘Cognitive Commitment’. These two commitments underlie the orientation and approach adopted by practicing cognitive linguists, and the assumptions and methodologies employed in the two main branches of the cognitive linguistics enterprise: cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar.



Once we have outlined the two commitments of cognitive linguistics, we then proceed to address the relationship between language, the mind and experience. The embodied cognition thesis holds that the human mind and conceptual organization are functions of the ways in which our species-specific
bodies interact with the environment we inhabit. Finally, we provide a brief overview and introduction to cognitive semantics and cognitive (approaches
to) grammar.
2.1 Two key commitments
Two key commitments: (1) the ‘Generalization Commitment’: a commitment to the characterization of general principles that are responsible for all aspects of human language, and (2) the Cognitive Commitment: a commitment to providing a characterization of general principles for language that accords with what is known about the mind and brain from other disciplines. We should discuss these two commitments and their implications.


2.1.1 The ‘Generalization Commitment’
In modern linguistics, the study of language is often separated into distinct areas such as phonology (sound), semantics (word and sentence meaning), pragmatics (meaning in discourse context), morphology (word structure) syntax (sentence structure) and so on.
This is particularly true of formal approaches: approaches to modelling language that posit explicit mechanical devices or procedures operating on theoretical primitives in order to produce the complete set of linguistic possibilities in a given language.
In the Generative Grammar approach developed by Noam Chomsky, it is usually argued that areas such as phonology, semantics and syntax concern significantly different kinds of structuring principles operating over different kinds of primitives. For instance, a syntax ‘module’ is an area in the mind concerned with structuring words into sentences, whereas a phonology ‘module’ is concerned with structuring sounds into patterns permitted by the rules of any given language, and by human language in general.
Cognitive linguistics acknowledges that it may often be useful, for practical purposes, to treat areas such as syntax, semantics and phonology as being notionally distinct. Below we briefly consider the properties of three areas of language in order to give an idea of how apparently distinct language components can be seen to share fundamental organizational features. The three areas we will look at are (1) categorization, (2) polysemy and (3) metaphor.
Categorisation
An important recent finding in cognitive psychology is that categorisation is not criterial. Human categories often appear to be fuzzy in nature, with some members of a category appearing to be more central and others more peripheral. Moreover, degree of centrality is often a function of the way we interact with a particular category at any given time. By way of illustration, consider the images in Figure 2.1.








Figure 2.1 Some members of the category CUP
Linguistic categories exhibit fuzziness and family resemblance. We illustrate this below – based on discussion in Taylor
(2003) – with one example from each of the following areas: morphology, syntax and phonology.

Categorization in morphology: the diminutive in Italian

Affixes mean ‘diminutive’ added to a word to convey the meaning ‘small’.
In Italian the diminutive suffix has a number of forms such as -ino, -etto, and -ello:
(1) paese → paesino
‘village’ ‘small village’
In the following example the diminutive signals affection rather than small size:
(2) mamma → mammina
‘mum’ ‘mummy’

When applied to abstract nouns, the diminutive acquires a meaning of short temporal duration, reduced strength or reduced scale:
(3) Sinfonia  Sinfonietta
“Symphony” “A shorter symphony, often with fewer
instruments”
(4) Cena → cenetta
‘supper’ ‘light supper’
(5) pioggia → ‘pioggerella
‘rain’ ‘drizzle’
When the diminutive is suffixed to adjective or adverbs, it serves to reduce intensity or extent:
(6) bello → bellino
‘beautiful’ ‘pretty/cute’
(7) bene → benino
‘well’ ‘quite well’
When the diminutive is added to verbs (the verbal diminutive suffixes are -icchiare and -ucchiare) a process of intermittent or poor quality is signalled:
(8) dormire → dormicchiare
‘sleep’ ‘snooze’
(9) lavorare → lavoricciare
“work” “work half-heartedly”
(10) Parlare → parlucchiare
“speak” “speak badly” (eg. A foreign language)








The category shares a related form and a related set of meanings: a reduction in size, quantity or quality. Hence, the category exhibits family resemblance.



Categorization in syntax: ‘parts of speech’
For example, a word formed by the addition of a suffix like -ness (for example, happi-ness) is a noun; a word that can take the plural suffix –s (for example, cat-s) is a noun; and a word that can fill the gap following a sequence of determiner the plus adjective funny (for example, the funny ____ ) is a noun.

Consider first the agentive nominalization of transitive verbs. A transitive verb is a verb that can take an object, such as import (e.g. rugs) and know (e.g. a fact). However, while transitive verbs can often be nominalized – that is, made into ‘agentive’ nouns like driver, singer and helper – some verbs, such as know, cannot be:
(11) a. John imports rugs →
John is an importer of rugs
b. John knew that fact →
*John was the knower of that fact
Now consider a second example. While verbs can often be substituted by the ‘be V-able’ construction, this does not always give rise to a well-formed sentence:
(12) a. His handwriting can be read →
His handwriting is readable
b. The lighthouse can be spotted →
*The lighthouse is spottable

Finally, while most transitive verbs undergo passivisation, not all do:
(13) a. John kicked the ball →
The ball was kicked by John
b. John owes two pounds →
*?Two pounds are owed by John
Despite these differences, these verbs do share some common ‘verbish’ behavior. For example, they can all take the third person present tense suffix -s (s/he
import-s/know-s/read-s/spot-s/kick-s/owe-s . . .).
Now let’s consider the linguistic category NOUN. While nouns can be broadly classified according to the morphological and distributional criteria we outlined
above, they also show considerable variation. For example, only some nouns can undergo what formal linguists call double raising. This term applies to a
process whereby a noun phrase ‘moves’ from an embedded clause to the subject position of the main clause via the subject position of another embedded clause. If you are not familiar with the grammatical terms ‘noun phrase’, ‘subject’ or ‘(embedded) clause’, the schematic representation in (14) should help.

Noun phrases, which are units built around nouns (but sometimes consist only of nouns (for example in the case of pronouns like me or proper names like George), are shown in boldtype. Square brackets represent the embedded clauses (sentences inside sentences) and the arrows show the ‘movement’.
Subject positions are underlined:










As these examples show, the noun phrase (NP) John can only occupy the subject position of a finite or tensed clause: when the verb appears in its ‘to infinitive’ form (for example, to be/to have), the NP John (which we interpret as the ‘doer’ of the cheating regardless of its position within the sentence) has to ‘move up’ the sentence until it finds a finite verb like is. However, some nouns, like headway, do not show the same grammatical behavior:








A tag question such as isn’t it?, don’t you? Or mustn’t he? can be tagged onto a sentence, where it picks up the reference of some previously mentioned unit. For example, in the sentence Bond loves blondes, doesn’t he? The pronoun he refers back to the subject noun phrase Bond. Despite the fact that this grammatical process can apply more or less freely to any subject noun phrase, Taylor (2003: 214) argues that there are nevertheless ‘some dubious cases’. For example, the use of a question tag with the noun heed is at best marginal:
(16) a. Some headway has been made. →
Some headway has been made, hasn’t it?
b. Little heed was paid to her. →
?*Little heed was paid to her, was it?
As we saw with verbs, examples can always be found that illustrate behavior that is at odds with the ‘typical’ behavior of this category. Although most linguists would not consider this variation sufficient grounds for abandoning the notion of word classes altogether, this variation nevertheless illustrates that categories like NOUN and VERB are not uniform in nature, but are ‘graded’ in the sense that members of these categories exhibit variable behavior.
Categorization in phonology: distinctive features
One of the fundamental concepts in phonology is the distinctive feature: an articulatory feature that serves to distinguish speech sounds.



The sounds were rated accurately by Jaeger and Ohala’s subjects in the sense that voiced and voiceless sounds do not overlap but can be partitioned at a single point on this continuum, as shown in (18b). However, what is striking is
that the subjects judged some voiced sounds (like /m/) as ‘more voiced’ than others (like /z/). These findings suggest that the phonological category VOICED SOUNDS also behaves like a fuzzy category.
Polysemy
Polysemy is the phenomenon where a single linguistic unit exhibits multiple distinct yet related meanings. Traditionally, this term is restricted to the area of
word meaning (lexical semantics).
Words like body have a range of distinct meanings that are nevertheless related (for example,
the human body; a corpse; the trunk of the human body; the main or central part of something).
Polysemy is contrasted with homonymy, where two words are pronounced and/or spelt the same way, but have distinct meanings.
Homonyms
Homophones
Homographs
Cognitive linguists argue that polysemy is not restricted to word meaning but is a fundamental feature of human language. According to this view, the ‘distinct’ areas of language all exhibit polysemy. Cognitive linguists therefore view
polysemy as a key to generalization across a range of ‘distinct’ phenomena, and argue that polysemy reveals important fundamental commonalities between lexical, morphological and syntactic organization.
Polysemy in the lexicon: over

English preposition over
Consider the following examples:
(19) a. The picture is over the sofa. ABOVE
b. The picture is over the hole. COVERING
c. The ball is over the wall. ON-THE-OTHER-SIDE-OF
d. The government handed over power. TRANSFER
e. She has a strange power over me. CONTROL
These sentences illustrate various senses of over, which are listed in the right hand column. While each is distinct, they can all be related to one another; they all derive from a central ‘above’ meaning. We will explore this point in more detail later in the book (see Chapter 10).


Polysemy in morphology: agentive -er suffix
Just as words like over exhibit polysemy, so do morphological categories.
Consider the bound morpheme -er, the agentive suffix that was briefly discussed earlier in the chapter:
(20) a. teacher
b. villager
c. toaster
d. best-seller
In each of the examples in (20), the -er suffix adds a slightly different meaning. In (20a) it conveys a human AGENT who regularly or by profession carries out
the action designated by the verb, in this instance teach.

Polysemy in syntax: ditransitive construction
Just as lexical and morphological categories exhibit polysemy, so do syntactic categories. For instance, consider the ditransitive construction, discussed by Goldberg (1995). This construction has the following syntax:
(21) SUBJECT VERB OBJECT 1 OBJECT 2
The ditransitive construction also has a range of conventional abstract meanings associated with it, which Goldberg characterizes in the terms shown in (22). Note for the time being that terms like AGENT PATIENT and RECIPIENT are labels for ‘semantic roles’, a topic to which we return in Part III of the book.
(22) a. SENSE 1: AGENT successfully causes recipient to receive PATIENT INSTANTIATED BY: verbs that inherently signify acts of giving (e.g. give, pass, hand, serve, feed)
e.g. [SUBJMary] [verbgave] [OBJ 1 John] [OBJ 2 the cake]
b. SENSE 2: conditions of satisfaction imply that AGENT causes recipient to receive PATIENT
INSTANTIATED BY: verbs of giving with associated satisfaction conditions (e.g. guarantee, promise, owe)
e.g. Mary promised John the cake
c. SENSE 3: AGENT causes recipient not to receive PATIENT INSTANTIATED BY: verbs of refusal (e.g. refuse, deny) e.g. Mary refused John the cake

d. SENSE 4: AGENT acts to cause recipient to receive PATIENT at some future point in time INSTANTIATED BY: verbs of future transfer (e.g. leave, bequeath,
allocate, reserve, grant) e.g. Mary left John the cake
e. SENSE 5: AGENT enables recipient to receive PATIENT INSTANTIATED BY: verbs of permission (e.g. permit, allow) e.g. Mary permitted John the cake
f. SENSE 6: AGENT intends to cause recipient to receive PATIENT INSTANTIATED BY: verbs involved in scenes of creation (e.g. bake, make, build, cook, sew, knit) e.g. Mary baked John the cake
While each of the abstract senses associated with ‘ditransitive’ syntax are distinct, they are clearly related: they all concern volitional transfer, although the nature of the transfer, or the
Metaphor

Cognitive linguists also argue that metaphor is a central feature of human language. As we saw in the previous chapter, metaphor is the phenomenon where one conceptual domain is systematically structured in terms of another. One important feature of metaphor is meaning extension. That is, metaphor can give rise to new meaning. Cognitive linguists argue that metaphor-based meaning extension can also be identified across a range of ‘distinct’ linguistic phenomena, and that metaphor therefore provides further evidence in favor of generalizing across the ‘distinct’ areas of language. In this section we’ll consider lexicon and syntax.

Metaphor in the lexicon: over (again)
In the previous section we observed that the preposition over exhibits polysemy. One question that has intrigued cognitive linguists concerns how polysemy is motivated. That is, how does a single lexical item come to have a multiplicity of distinct yet related meanings associated with it? Lakoff (1987) has argued that an important factor in motivating meaning extension, and hence the existence of polysemy, is metaphor. For instance, he argues that the CONTROL meaning of over that we saw in (19e) derives from the ABOVE meaning by virtue of metaphor. This is achieved via application of the metaphor
CONTROL IS UP. This metaphor is illustrated by (23):

(23) a. I’m on top of the situation.
b. She’s at the height of her powers.
c. His power rose.
These examples illustrate that POWER or CONTROL is being understood in terms of greater elevation (UP). In contrast, lack of power or lack of control is conceptualized in terms of occupying a reduced elevation on the vertical axis (DOWN), as shown by (24):
(24) a. Her power is on the decline.
b. He is under my control.
c. He’s low in the company hierarchy.
By virtue of the independent metaphor CONTROL IS UP, the lexical item over, which has an ABOVE meaning conventionally associated with it, can be understood metaphorically as indicating greater control. Through
frequency of use the meaning of CONTROL becomes conventionally associated with over in such a way that over can be used in non-spatial contexts like (19e), where it acquires the CONTROL meaning.
Metaphor in the syntax: the ditransitive (again)
One of the observations that Goldberg makes in her analysis of the ditransitive construction is that it typically requires a volitional AGENT in subject position.
This is because the meaning associated with the construction is one of intentional transfer. Unless there is a sentient AGENT who has the capacity for intention, then one entity cannot be transferred to another. However, we do find examples of this construction where the subject (in square brackets) is not
a volitional AGENT:
(25) a. [The rain] gave us some time.
b. [The missed ball] handed him the victory.
Goldberg argues that examples like these are extensions of the ditransitive construction, and are motivated by the existence of the metaphor CAUSAL EVENTS ARE PHYSICAL TRANSFERS. Evidence for this metaphor comes from examples like the ones in (26), which illustrate that we typically understand abstract causes in terms of physical transfer:
(26) a. David Beckham put a lot of swerve on the ball.
b. She gave me a headache.
In these examples causal events like causing a soccer ball to swerve, or causing someone to have a headache, are conceptualized as the transfer of a physical entity.
Clearly the English soccer star David Beckham, well known for his ability to ‘bend’ a football around defensive walls, cannot literally put ‘swerve’ on a football; ‘swerve’ is not a physical entity that can be ‘put’ anywhere.
However, we have no problem understanding what this sentence means. This is because we ‘recognise’ the convention within our language system of understanding causal events metaphorically in terms of physical transfer.
Goldberg argues that it is due to this metaphor that the ditransitive construction, which normally requires a volitional AGENT, can sometimes have a non-volitional subject like a missed ball or the rain. The metaphor licenses the extension of the ditransitive so that it can be used with non-volitional AGENTs.
2.1.2 The ‘Cognitive Commitment’
The ‘Generalization Commitment’ leads to the search for principles of language structure that hold across all aspects of language. In a related manner,
the ‘Cognitive Commitment’ represents the view that principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition from other disciplines, particularly the other cognitive sciences (philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence and neuroscience).


Language and linguistic organization should reflect general cognitive principles rather than cognitive principles that are specific to language. Accordingly, cognitive linguistics rejects the modular theory of mind that we mentioned above (section 2.1.1).
Cognitive linguists specifically reject the claim that there is a distinct language module, which asserts that linguistic structure and organization are markedly distinct from other aspects of cognition (see Chapter 4). Below we consider three lines of evidence that, according to cognitive linguists, substantiate the view that linguistic organization reflects more general cognitive function.


Attention: profiling in language
A very general cognitive ability that human beings have is attention. Language provides ways of directing attention to certain aspects of the scene being linguistically encoded. This general ability, manifest in language, is called profiling (Langacker 1987, among others; see also Talmy’s (2000) related notion of attentional windowing).
One important way in which language exhibits profiling is in the range of grammatical constructions it has at its disposal, each of which serves to profile
different aspects of a given scene.
(27) a. The boy kicks over the vase.
b. The vase is kicked over.
c. The vase smashes into bits.
d. The vase is in bits.
In order to discuss the differences between the examples in (27), we’ll be relying on some grammatical terminology that may be new to the reader. We will explain these terms briefly as we go along, but grammatical terms are explained in more detail in the grammar tutorial in Chapter 14.
The aspects of the scene profiled by each of these sentences are represented in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.2(a) corresponds to sentence (27a). This is an active sentence in which a relationship holds between the initiator of the action (the boy) and the object that undergoes the action (the vase). In other words, the boy is the AGENT and the vase is the PATIENT. In Figure 2.2(a) both AGENT and PATIENT are represented by circles. The arrow from the AGENT to

the PATIENT represents the transfer of energy, reflecting the fact that the AGENT is acting upon the PATIENT. Moreover, both AGENT and PATIENT, as well as the energy transfer, are represented in bold. This captures the fact that the entire action chain is being profiled, which is the purpose of the active construction.
Now let’s compare sentence (27b). This is a passive sentence, and is represented by Figure 2.2(b). Here, the energy transfer and the PATIENT are being profiled. However, while the AGENT is not mentioned in the sentence, and hence is not in profile, it must be understood as part of the background. After all, an action chain requires an AGENT to instigate the transfer of energy. To represent this fact, the AGENT is

included in Figure 2.2(a), but is not featured in bold, reflecting the position that the AGENT is contextually understood but not in profile.
The third sentence, example (27c), profiles the change in the state of the vase: the fact that it smashes into bits. This is achieved via a subject-verbcomplement construction. A complement is an obligatory element that is required by another element in a sentence to complete its meaning. In (27c), the complement is the expression into bits, which completes the meaning of the expression smashes. This is captured by Figure 2.2(c). In figure 2.2(c) it is the internal change of state of the vase that is profiled. The arrow within the circle
(the circle depicts the vase) shows that the vase is undergoing an internal change of state. The state the

vase is ‘moving to’ is represented by the box with the letter ‘b’ inside it. This stands for the state IN BITS. In this diagram the entity, the change of state and the resulting state are all in bold, reflecting the fact that all these aspects of the action chain are being profiled by the corresponding sentence.








Figure 2.2 Profiling

Finally, consider sentence (27d). The grammatical form of this sentence is the subject-copula-complement construction. The copula is the verb be, which is specialized for encoding a particular state. In this case the state is IN BITS, which is captured in Figure 2.2(d).
In sum, each of the constructions ACTIVE, PASSIVE, SUBJECT-VERBCOMPLEMENT and SUBJECT-COPULA-COMPLEMENT is specialized for profiling
a particular aspect of an action chain. In this way, linguistic structure reflects our ability to attend to distinct aspects of a scene. These examples demonstrate how linguistic organization reflects a more general cognitive ability: attention.
It is worth observing at this point that constructions of the kind we have just discussed are not restricted to encoding a canonical action chain (one involving
the transfer of energy). For example, the active construction can often be applied in cases where an action is not involved. Consider stative verbs, like
own. A stative verb encodes a relatively stable state that persists over time. This verb can appear in active or passive constructions, even though it describes
a state rather than an action:
(28) a. John not Steve owns the shop on Trafalgar Street. [active]
b. The shop on Trafalgar Street is owned by John not Steve. [passive]

2.2 The embodied mind
In this section, we turn to embodiment, a central idea in cognitive linguistics. Since the seventeenth-century French philosopher René Descartes developed
the view that mind and body are distinct entities – the principle of mind/body dualism – there has been a common assumption within philosophy and the
other more recent cognitive sciences that the mind can be studied without recourse to the body, and hence without recourse to embodiment. In modern
linguistics this rationalist approach has been most evident in formal approaches such as the Generative Grammar approach developed by Noam Chomsky and formal approaches to semantics, such as the framework.
Proponents of these approaches argue that it is possible to study language as a formal or computational system, without taking into account the nature of human bodies or human experience.
In contrast, cognitive linguistics is not rationalist in this sense, but instead takes its inspiration from traditions in psychology and philosophy that emphasize the importance of human experience, the centrality of the human body, and human-specific cognitive structure and organization, all of which affect the nature of our experience. According to this empiricist view, the human mind – and therefore language – cannot be investigated in isolation from human embodiment.

2.2.1 Embodied experience
The idea that experience is embodied entails that we have a species-specific view of the world due to the unique nature of our physical bodies. In other words, our construal of reality is likely to be mediated in large measure by the nature of our bodies.
The idea that different organisms have different kinds of experiences due to the nature of their embodiment is known as variable embodiment.
2.2.2 Embodied cognition
The fact that our experience is embodied – that is, structured in part by the nature of the bodies we have and by our neurological organization – has consequences for cognition. In other words, the concepts we have access to and the nature of the ‘reality’ we think and talk about are a function of our embodiment: we can only talk about what we can perceive and conceive, and the things that we can perceive and conceive derive from embodied experience. From this point of view, the human mind must bear the imprint of embodied experience.

One way in which embodied experience manifests itself at the cognitive level is in terms of image schemas. These are rudimentary concepts like CONTACT, CONTAINER and BALANCE, which are meaningful because they derive from and are linked to human pre-conceptual experience: experience of the world directly mediated and structured by the human body. These image-schematic concepts are not disembodied abstractions, but derive their substance, in large measure, from the sensory-perceptual experiences that give rise to them in the first place. Embodied concepts of this kind can be systematically extended to provide more abstract concepts and conceptual domains with structure.

This process is called conceptual projection. For example, they argue that conceptual metaphor is a form of conceptual projection.
According to this view, the reason we can talk about being in states like love or trouble (29) is because abstract concepts like LOVE are structured and therefore understood by virtue of the fundamental concept CONTAINER. In this way, embodied experience serves to structure more complex concepts and ideas.
(29) a. George is in love.
b. Lily is in trouble.
c. The government is in a deep crisis.

Consider the spatial scene described in (30).
(30) The coffee is in the cup.
. . . the spatial scene relating to in involves a containment function, which encompasses several consequences such as locating and limiting the activities of the contained entity. Being contained in the cup prevents the coffee from spreading out over the table; if we move the cup, the coffee moves with it.
It is for this reason that the English preposition in can be used in scenes that are non-spatial in nature, like the examples in (29). It is precisely because containers constrain activity that it makes sense to conceptualize POWER and all-encompassing states like LOVE or CRISIS in terms of CONTAINMENT.


2.2.3 Experiential realism
An important consequence of viewing experience and conceptualization as embodied is that this affects our view of what reality is. However, cognitive linguists argue that this objectivist approach misses the point that there cannot be an objective reality that language reflects directly, because reality is not objectively given. This is not to say that cognitive linguists deny the existence of an objective physical world independent of human beings.
This view of reality has been termed experientialism or experiential realism by cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Experiential realism assumes that there is a reality ‘out there’.
2.3 Cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar
Cognitive linguistics can be broadly divided into two main areas: cognitive semantics and cognitive (approaches to) grammar. However,
unlike formal approaches to linguistics, which often emphasize the role of grammar, cognitive linguistics emphasizes the role of meaning.
A cognitive grammar assumes a cognitive semantics and is dependent upon it.
Cognitive grammarians are developing a collection of theories that can collectively be called construction grammars.













Figure 2.3 The study of meaning and grammar in cognitive linguistics
Summary
+ Two key commitments: ‘Generalization Commitment’ and the ‘Cognitive Commitment’
+ Two main branches of the cognitive linguistics enterprise: cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar.
+ The embodied cognition thesis holds that the human mind and conceptual organization are functions of the ways in which our species-specific
bodies interact with the environment we inhabit.
+ The ‘Generalization Commitment’: formal approaches: approaches to modelling language (Phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, etc.)
Cognitive linguistics acknowledges the properties of three areas of language: (1) categorization, (2) polysemy and (3) metaphor.
- Categorization: (fuzzy) centrality >< peripheral - Categorization in morphology: the diminutive in Italian – parts of speech – Tag questions – phonology, etc.
- Polysemy: A word has many meanings >< Homonymy (different words)
Cognitive linguists argue that polysemy is not restricted to word meaning but is a fundamental feature of human language.
- Metaphor: (Meaning extension) Metaphor in the lexicon - Metaphor in the syntax
+ The ‘Cognitive Commitment’: The ‘Cognitive Commitment’ represents the view that principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition.

+ The embodied mind
Attention: profiling
We have a species-specific view of the world due to the unique nature of our physical bodies.
+ Embodied cognition: our experience is embodied.
We embody our experiences which are affected by realism.
+ Cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar
Grammar is not based on functions, but meanings (constructions).
Exercises
2.1 Categorisation and family resemblance
The philosopher Wittgenstein famously argued that the category GAME exhibits family resemblance. To test this, first make a list of as many different kinds of games as you can think of. Now see if there is a limited set of conditions that is common to this entire list (‘necessary’ conditions) and sufficient to distinguish this category from other related categories (‘sufficient’ conditions) like competitions, amusement activities and so on. Do your conclusions support or refute Wittgenstein’s claim?
Now see if you can identify the ways in which the different games you list share family resemblance ‘traits’. Try to construct a ‘radial’ network showing
the degrees of family resemblance holding between games of different kinds. A radial network is a diagram in which the most/more prototypical game(s) is/are placed at the centre and less prototypical games are less central, radiating out from the centre.

2.2 Polysemy
Consider the word head. Try and come up with as many different meanings for this word as possible. You may find it helpful to collect or create sentences
involving the word.
Now consider the closed-class word you. Cognitive linguists assume that even closed-class words exhibit polysemy. Collect as many sentences as you can
involving you and try and identify differences in how this word is used. Do your findings support the view that this word exhibits polysemy?
2.3 Metaphor
Reconsider the different meanings for head that you uncovered in the previous exercise. Would you class any of these distinct meanings as metaphorical?
Explain your reasoning. Now try and give an account of what motivated the extension from the ‘core’ meaning of head to the metaphoric usage(s).
2.4 Image schemas
The spatial meanings associated with prepositions present a clear case of the way in which image schemas underpin language. In view of this, what sets of image schemas might underpin the semantic distinction between the prepositions up/down and above/under?
Now consider the metaphoric use of the prepositions on and in in the following sentences:
(a) The guard is on duty.
(a´) The shoes are on sale.
(b) Munch’s painting The Scream portrays a figure in despair.
(b´) Sven is in trouble with Nancy.
What might be the experiential basis for the fact that states like SALES and DUTY are described in terms of ON, while states like DESPAIR and TROUBLE are
described in terms of IN? We saw in this chapter that the CONTAINER image schema plausibly underpins IN. What might be the image schema underpinning ON?
Good luck!