INTRODUCTION TO
COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS
TRUONG VAN ANH
truongvananh@cvseas.edu.vn
Unit 9: Metaphor and metonymy
In this chapter, we will examine the central claims associated with Conceptual Metaphor Theory. This framework was first proposed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their 1980 book Metaphors We Live By and has been developed in a number of subsequent publications. According to this view, conceptual structure is organized according to crossdomain mappings or correspondences between conceptual domains. Some of these mappings are due to pre-conceptual embodied experiences while others build on these experiences in order to form more complex conceptual structures.
According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, this is because the conceptual domain QUANTITY is conventionally structured and therefore understood in terms of the conceptual domain VERTICAL ELEVATION. Conceptual operations
involving mappings, such as conceptual metaphor, are known more generally as conceptual projection. Recent work, particularly since Gibbs (1994), has also begun to emphasise the importance of a cognitive operation called conceptual metonymy.
9.1 Literal versus figurative language
In this section we begin our examination of metaphor and metonymy by considering whether there really is a distinction to be made between literal language and figurative language. The traditional position, both in philosophy and in linguistics – and indeed the everyday view – is that (1) there is a stable
and unambiguous notion of literality, and (2) that there is a sharp distinction to be made between literal language, on the one hand, and non-literal or figurative language on the other.
9.1.1 Literal and figurative language as complex concepts
Traditionally, there are two kinds of meaning that can be straightforwardly distinguished: literal and figurative meaning. However, as Gibbs shows, there are many different kinds of literal and figurative meaning.
Four definitions of literal language
Conventional literality, in which literal usage is contrasted with poetic usage, exaggeration, embellishment, indirectness, etc.
Non-metaphorical literality, or directly meaningful language, in which one word (concept) is never understood in terms of a second word (or concept).
Truth conditional literality, or language that is capable of ‘fitting the world’ (that is, referring to objectively existing objects or of being objectively true or false).
Context-free literality, in which the literal meaning of an expression is its meaning [independent of any communicative situation].


Definitions of non-literal language
Not only have different scholars assumed different definitions of literal language, there are many definitions of non-literal language. Here, we consider just a few categories of ‘non-literal’ language use: irony, zeugma and metonymy.
An expression is ironic when what is meant is the opposite of what is said.
This is illustrated by the response of ‘Teenage son’ to his mother in example (1).
(1) Mother: Time for bed . . . You have a BIG exam in the morning!
Teenage son: I can’t wait (uttered without enthusiasm).

Zeugma is a kind of ellipsis, in which a lexical item is understood, but ‘left out’ in subsequent clauses within a sentence, and where this lexical item has a different semantic or grammatical status in each case. One consequence is that when a lexical item has more than one meaning, a different meaning can be invoked in each clause. This can result in a humorous effect, as in example (2), where two different meanings of expire are invoked:
(2) On the same day my old Dad expired, so did my driving licence.
Metonymy depends upon an association between two entities so that one entity can stand for the other. Consider example (3):
(3) a. My wheels are parked out (the) back.
b. My motor is parked out (the) back.
In this example, a salient component of a car, namely the wheels or the motor, can be used to refer to the car as a whole.

9.1.2 Can the distinction be maintained?
Recall from above that the traditional view holds that literal language is markedly distinct from non-literal or figurative language.
Conventional versus non-conventional language use
This distinction relies upon the idea that while literal language is the conventional ‘ordinary’ or ‘everyday’ way we have of talking about things, figurative language is ‘exotic’ or ‘literary’ and only need concern creative writers. Consider the following examples, in which the figurative expressions are highlighted:
(4) Things are going smoothly in the operating theatre.
(5) He was in a state of shock after the election result.
(6) The economy is going from bad to worse.
These sentences are representative of ‘ordinary’, ‘everyday’ ways of talking about events like operations, emotional or psychological states, and changes in the economy.


Metaphorical versus non-metaphorical language use
Another definition of literality identified by Gibbs is non- metaphorical literality. According to this view, literal language is language that directly expresses meaning rather than relying upon metaphor. This view entails that we should always be able to express our ‘true’ meaning without recourse to metaphorical
language, which involves expressing one idea in terms of another. For example, while the sentence in (7) has literal meaning, the sentence in (8) does not because it employs a metaphor: Achilles is understood in terms of a lion, which
conveys the idea that Achilles has some quality understood as typical of lions such as fearlessness. This interpretation arises from our folk knowledge of lions, which stipulates that they are brave.
(7) Achilles is brave.
(8) Achilles is a lion.

However, it is difficult to find a non-metaphorical way of thinking and talking about certain concepts. For example, try talking about TIME without recourse to expressions relating to SPACE or MOTION. Consider example (9).
(9) a. Christmas is approaching.
b. We’re moving towards Christmas.
c. Christmas is not very far away.
Each of these expressions relies upon language relating to motion or space in order to convey the idea that the temporal concept CHRISTMAS is imminent. These expressions represent ordinary everyday ways of talking about time. Indeed, it turns out to be more difficult to find ways of describing temporal concepts that do not rely on metaphorical language (see Evans 2004a). If
certain concepts are wholly or mainly understood in metaphorical terms, then the non-metaphorical definition of literality entails that concepts like CHRISTMAS or TIME somehow lack meaning in their own right. Indeed, some scholars have actually claimed that time is not a ‘real’ experience. However, many everyday concepts
appear to be understood in metaphorical terms. Consider the concept ANGER. Emotions like anger are, in developmental terms, among the earliest human experiences. Despite this, the way we conceptualise and describe this concept is highly metaphorical in nature, as the following examples illustrate.
(10) a. You make my blood boil.
b. He was red with anger.
c. She’s just letting off steam.
d. Don’t fly off the handle.
e. Try to get a grip on yourself.
f. He almost burst a blood vessel.
Consider another example. We typically think and talk about ARGUMENT in terms of WAR. The examples in (11) are from Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 4).


(11) a. Your claims are indefensible.
b. He attacked every weak point in my argument.
c. His criticisms were right on target.
d. I demolished his argument.
e. I’ve never won an argument with him.
f. You disagree? Okay, shoot!
g. If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.
h. He shot down all of my arguments.
As these examples demonstrate, the non-metaphorical definition of literality, which entails that we should always be able to express ourselves without recourse to metaphoric language, does not appear to present an accurate picture of the facts.


The intuition behind the approach is that an important function of language is to describe states of
affairs. Consider example (12).
(12) It’s raining in London.
This sentence describes a state of affairs in the world and can be assessed as either true or false of a given situation, real or hypothetical. According to the truth-conditional definition of literality, example (12) represents literal language because it can either be literally true or false of a given situation. In
contrast, expressions like It’s raining in my heart or You are my sunshine can only be literally false and are therefore figurative. However, many linguistic expressions do not describe situations at all, and cannot therefore be meaningfully evaluated as true or false. Consider the examples in (13).
(13) a. Get well soon!
b. Can you pass the salt please?
c. I now pronounce you man and wife.
These examples represent speech acts. For instance, the function of the example in (13c) is not to describe a situation, but to change some aspect of the world (this idea was introduced in Chapter 1). If we adopt the truth-conditional view of literality, which rests upon the idea of literal truth, expressions like those in (13) are neither literal nor figurative since they cannot be evaluated as true (or false) with respect to a given situation.
Context-free versus context-dependent language use
The truth-conditional view also holds that literal meaning is context-independent. This means that literal meaning does not require a context in order to be fully interpreted. Consider example (14).
(14) a. The cat sat on the mat.
b. My cat is a greedy pig.
According to this view, (14a) is fully interpretable independent of any context and the meaning we retrieve from (14a) is literal. In contrast, example (14b), which contains a metaphor, relies upon a context in which a cat habitually eats a lot in order to be fully understood. If this example were interpreted literally it would result in contradiction, since a cat cannot literally be a pig.
In sum, we have examined a number of different definitions of literality identified by Gibbs in the cognitive science literature. We have seen that each of these definitions is problematic in certain respects. In particular, it seems that it is difficult to establish a neat dividing line between literal and figurative
meaning. In the remainder of this chapter, we examine metaphor and metonymy: two phenomena that have traditionally been described as categories of figurative language use. As we will see, cognitive semanticists view metaphor and metonymy as phenomena fundamental to the structure of the conceptual
system rather than superficial linguistic ‘devices’.
9.2 What is metaphor?
For over 2,000 years, metaphor was studied within the discipline known as rhetoric. This discipline was first established in ancient Greece, and was focused on practical instruction in how to persuade others of a particular point of view by the use of rhetorical devices. Metaphor was one of these devices, which were called tropes by rhetoricians. Due to its central importance,
metaphor came to be known as the master trope. Within this approach, metaphor was characterized by the schematic form: A is B, as in Achilles is a lion. As a consequence, metaphor has been identified since the time of Aristotle with implicit comparison. In other words, while metaphor is based on the
comparison of two categories, the comparison is not explicitly marked. This contrasts with simile, where the comparison is overtly signalled by the use of as or like: Achilles is as brave as a lion; Achilles is brave, like a lion.
Clearly, examples of metaphor like Achilles is a lion are based on comparison. Following Grady (1997a, 1999) we will use the term perceived resemblance to describe this comparison. In this case, the resemblance is not physical: Achilles does not actually look like a lion. Instead, due to cultural knowledge which holds that lions are courageous, by describing Achilles as a lion we associate him with the lion’s qualities of courage and ferocity. Metaphors of this kind are called resemblance metaphors (Grady 1999).
Resemblance metaphors based on physical resemblance have been called image metaphors (Lakoff and Turner 1989). In other words, image metaphors are one subset of resemblance-based metaphors. For instance, consider the following translation of the beginning of André Breton’s surrealist poem ‘Free Union’, cited in Lakoff and Turner (1989: 93):


My wife whose hair is a brush fire
Whose thoughts are summer lightning
Whose waist is an hourglass
Whose waist is the waist of an otter caught in the teeth of a tiger
Whose mouth is a bright cockade with the fragrance of a star of the first magnitude
Whose teeth leave prints like the tracks of white mice over snow
Several of these lines represent image metaphors. For example, in the third line the poet is establishing a visual resemblance between the shape of his wife’s
waist and the shape of an hourglass.


Resemblance metaphors have received considerable attention within conceptual metaphor theory, particularly within the approach now known as Cognitive Poetics (see Lakoff and Turner 1989 for a seminal study; see also Stockwell 2002, and Gavins and Steen 2003).
(15) a. Look how far we’ve come.
b. We’re at a crossroads.
c. We’ll just have to go our separate ways.
d. We can’t turn back now.
e. I don’t think this relationship is going anywhere.
f. Where are we?
g. We’re stuck.
h. It’s been a long, bumpy road.
i. This relationship is a dead-end street.
j. We’re just spinning our wheels.
k. Our marriage is on the rocks.
l. This relationship is foundering.

What is striking about these examples is that they represent ordinary everyday ways of talking about relationships: there is nothing stylised or overtly poetic about these expressions. Moreover, for the most part, they do not make use of
the linguistic formula A is B, which is typical of resemblance metaphors. However, these expressions are clearly non-literal: a relationship cannot literally spin its wheels, nor stand at the crossroads.
This pattern led Lakoff and Johnson to hypothesise a conventional link at the conceptual level between the domain of LOVE RELATIONSHIPS and the domain of JOURNEYS. According to this view, LOVE, which is the target (the
domain being described), is conventionally structured in terms of JOURNEYS, which is the source (the domain in terms of which the target is described). This association is called a conceptual metaphor.
The metaphor works by mapping roles from the source onto the target: LOVERS become TRAVELLERS (We’re at a
crossroads), who travel by a particular MEANS OF TRANSPORT (We’re spinning our wheels), proceeding along a particular ROUTE (Our relationship went off course), impeded by obstacles (Our marriage is on the rocks). As these examples demonstrate, a metaphorical link between two domains consists of a number of distinct correspondences or mappings. These mappings are illustrated in Table 9.1.
It is conventional in the conceptual metaphor literature, following Lakoff and Johnson, to make use of the ‘A is B’ formula to describe conceptual metaphor: for example, LOVE IS A JOURNEY.
The important claim to emerge from Metaphors We Live By was that conceptual metaphors are grounded in the nature of our everyday interaction with the world. That is, conceptual metaphor has an experiential basis.
Table 9.1 Mappings for LOVE IS A JOURNEY










Consider the following linguistic evidence for the metaphor QUANTITY IS VERTICAL ELEVATION:
(16) a. The price of shares is going up.
b. She got a high score in her exam.
In these sentences there is a conventional reading related to QUANTITY. In (16a) the sentence refers to an increase in share prices. In (16b) it refers to an exam result that represents a numerical quantity. Although each of these readings is perfectly conventional, the lexical items that provide these readings, going up and high, refer literally to the concept of VERTICAL ELEVATION. Examples like these suggest that QUANTITY and VERTICAL ELEVATION are associated in some way at the conceptual level. The question is, what motivates these associations?
QUANTITY and VERTICAL ELEVATION are often correlated and these correlations are ubiquitous in our everyday experience.

9.3 Conceptual Metaphor Theory
Conceptual Metaphor Theory has been highly influential both within cognitive linguistics and within the cognitive and social sciences, particularly in neighboring disciplines like cognitive psychology and anthropology.
9.3.1 The unidirectionality of metaphor
An important observation made by conceptual metaphor theorists is that conceptual metaphors are unidirectional. This means that metaphors map structure from a source domain to a target domain but not vice versa. For example, while we conceptualise LOVE in terms of JOURNEYS, we cannot conventionally structure JOURNEYS in terms of LOVE: travellers are not conventionally described as ‘lovers’, or car crashes in terms of ‘heartbreak’, and so on. Hence, the terms ‘target’ and ‘source’ encode the unidirectional nature of the mapping.



Lakoff and Turner (1989) observed that unidirectionality holds even when two different metaphors share the same domains. For example, they identified the two metaphors PEOPLE ARE MACHINES and MACHINES ARE PEOPLE, which are illustrated in examples (17) and (18), respectively.
(17) PEOPLE ARE MACHINES
a. John always gets the highest scores in maths; he’s a human calculator.
b. He’s so efficient; he’s just a machine!
c. He’s had a nervous breakdown.
(18) MACHINES ARE PEOPLE
a. I think my computer hates me; it keeps deleting my data.
b. This car has a will of its own!
c. I don’t think my car wants to start this morning.


Although these two metaphors appear to be the mirror image of one another, close inspection reveals that each metaphor involves distinct mappings: in the PEOPLE ARE MACHINES metaphor, the mechanical and functional attributes associated with computers are mapped onto people, such as their speed and efficiency, their part-whole structure and the fact that they break down. In the MACHINES ARE PEOPLE metaphor, it is the notion of desire and volition that is mapped onto the machine. This shows that even when two metaphors share the
same two domains, each metaphor is distinct in nature because it relies upon different mappings.


9.3.2 Motivation for target and source
Based on an extensive survey, Kövecses (2002) found that the most common source domains for metaphorical mappings include domains relating to the HUMAN BODY (the heart of the problem), ANIMALS (a sly fox), PLANTS (the fruit of her labour), FOOD (he cooked up a story) and FORCES (don’t push me!).
The most common target domains included conceptual categories like EMOTION (she was deeply moved), MORALITY (she resisted the temptation), THOUGHT (I see your point), HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS (they built a strong marriage) and TIME (time flies).
Time is primarily conceptualized in terms of SPACE, and MOTION through space, as illustrated by the examples in (19).
(19) a. Christmas is coming.b. The relationship lasted a long time.
c. The time for a decision has come.
d. We’re approaching my favorite time of the year.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) argue that TIME is structured in terms of MOTION because our understanding of TIME emerges from our experience and awareness of CHANGE, a salient aspect of which involves MOTION. For instance, whenever we travel from place A to place B, we experience CHANGE in location.
This type of event also corresponds to a temporal span of a certain duration. From this perspective, our experience of time – that is, our awareness of change – is grounded in more basic experiences like motion events. Lakoff and Johnson argue that this comparison of location at the beginning and end points
of a journey, gives rise to our experience of time: embodied experiences like MOTION partially structure the more abstract domain TIME. This gives rise to the general metaphor TIME IS MOTION.
9.3.3 Metaphorical entailments
In addition to the individual mappings that conceptual metaphors bring with them, they also provide additional, sometimes quite detailed knowledge. This is because aspects of the source domain that are not explicitly stated in the mappings can be inferred. In this way, metaphoric mappings carry entailments or rich inferences. Consider the examples in (20), which relate to the conceptual metaphor AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY:
(20) a. We will proceed in a step-by-step fashion.
b. We have covered a lot of ground.
In this metaphor, PARTICIPANTS in the argument correspond to TRAVELLERS, the ARGUMENT itself corresponds to a JOURNEY and the PROGRESS of the argument corresponds to the ROUTE taken. However, in the source domain
JOURNEY, travellers can get lost, they can stray from the path, they can fail to reach their destination, and so on.
The association between source and target gives rise to the entailment (the rich inference) that these events can also occur
in the target domain ARGUMENT. This is illustrated by the examples in (21) which show that structure that holds in the source domain can be inferred as holding in the target domain.
(21) a. I got lost in the argument.
b. We digressed from the main point.
c. He failed to reach the conclusion.
d. I couldn’t follow the argument.
9.3.4 Metaphor systems
An early finding by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) was that conceptual metaphors interact with each other and can give rise to relatively complex metaphor systems. These systems are collections of more schematic metaphorical mappings that structure a range of more specific metaphors like LIFE IS A JOURNEY. Lakoff (1993) outlines a particularly intricate example of a metaphor system which he calls the event structure metaphor.
This is actually a series of metaphors that interact in the interpretation of utterances. The individual metaphors that make up the event structure metaphor, together with linguistic
examples, are shown in table 9.2.
In order to illustrate how the event structure metaphor applies, consider the specific metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. This is illustrated by the examples in (22).
(22) a. STATES ARE LOCATIONS
He’s at a crossroads in his life.
b. CHANGE IS MOTION
He went from his forties to his fifties without a hint of a mid-life
crisis.
c. CAUSES ARE FORCES
He got a head start in life.
d. PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS
I can’t ever seem to get to where I want to be in life.
e. MEANS ARE PATHS
He followed an unconventional course during his life.

f. DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION
Throughout his working life problematic professional relationships had somehow always got in his way.
g. PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS
His life had been a rather strange journey.
Table 9.2 The event structure metaphor


9.3.5 Metaphors and image schemas
Lakoff and Johnson both argued that image schemas could serve as source domains for metaphoric mapping. The rationale for this view can be summarized as follows: image schemas appear to be knowledge structures that emerge directly
from pre-conceptual embodied experience. For example, our image-schematic concept COUNTERFORCE arises from the experience of being unable to proceed because some opposing force is resisting our attempt to move forward.
Conceptual Metaphor Theory holds that abstract concepts can, at least in part, be traced back to image schemas.

9.3.6 Invariance
After all, if metaphor is ultimately based on
image schemas, with chains of inheritance relations giving rise to highly abstract and specific metaphors like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, ARGUMENT IS WAR and so on, it is important to establish what licenses the selection of particular image schemas by particular target domains and why unattested mappings are not licensed.
Lakoff and Turner (1989) observed that the concept of DEATH is personified in a number of ways (which means that a concept has human-like properties attributed to it, such as intentionality and volition).
Lakoff posited the Invariance Principle: Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain.
(Lakoff 1993: 215) There are a number of specific death personification metaphors, including DEATH IS A DEVOURER, DEATH IS A REAPER and DEATH IS A DESTROYER, which inherit structures from a more schematic metaphor, which Lakoff and Turner (1989) call a generic-level metaphor: EVENTS ARE ACTIONS (or INANIMATE PHENOMENA ARE HUMAN AGENTS).
The Invariance Principle also predicts that metaphoric entailments that are incompatible with the target domain will fail to map. Consider the examples in (23), which relate to the metaphor CAUSATION IS TRANSFER (OF AN OBJECT):
(23) a. She gave him a headache. STATE
b. She gave him a kiss. EVENT
While the source domain for both of these examples is TRANSFER, the first example relates to a STATE and the second to an EVENT. The source domain TRANSFER entails that the recipient is in possession of the transferred entity. However, while this entailment is in keeping with STATES because they are
temporally unbounded, the same entailment is incompatible with EVENTS because they are temporally bounded and cannot therefore ‘stretch’ across time. This is illustrated by (24).
(24) a. She gave him a headache and he still has it. STATE
b. *She gave him a kiss and he still has it. EVENT
The process that prevents entailments from projecting to the target domain is called target domain override (Lakoff 1993).
9.3.8 Hiding and highlighting
An important idea in Conceptual Metaphor Theory relates to hiding and highlighting: when a target is structured in terms of a particular source, this highlights certain aspects of the target while simultaneously hiding other aspects. For example, invoking the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR highlights the adversarial nature of argument but hides the fact that argument often involves an ordered and organized development of a particular topic (He won the argument, I couldn’t defend that point, and so on). In contrast, the metaphor AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY highlights the progressive and organizational aspects of arguments while hiding the confrontational aspects (We’ll proceed in step-bystep fashion; We’ve covered a lot of ground).
9.4 Primary Metaphor Theory
According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, the purpose of metaphor is to map structure onto abstract domains.
9.4.1 Primary and compound metaphors
In an influential study, Joseph Grady (1997a) proposed two kinds of metaphor: primary metaphor and compound metaphor. While primary metaphors are foundational, compound metaphors are constructed from the unification of primary metaphors. Grady’s central claim, which marks his approach as distinct from earlier work in Conceptual Metaphor Theory, is that primary metaphors conventionally associate concepts that are equally ‘basic’, in the sense that they are both directly experienced and perceived.
(25) SIMILARITY IS NEARNESS
That colour is quite close to the one on our dining-room wall.
(26) IMPORTANCE IS SIZE
We’ve got a big week coming up at work.
(27) QUANTITY IS VERTICAL ELEVATION
The price of shares has gone up.
(28) CAUSES ARE FORCES
Vanity drove me to have the operation.
(29) CHANGE IS MOTION
Things have shifted a little since you were last here.
(30) DESIRE IS HUNGER
We’re hungry for a victory.

9.4.2 Experiential correlation
If primary target and primary source concepts are equally ‘basic’ which renders the Invariance Principle redundant, what motivates their association? Grady maintains the assumption fundamental to Conceptual Metaphor Theory that there is an experiential basis for primary metaphor formation. However, in Grady’s theory there must be a clear and direct experiential basis: an experiential correlation. Consider again the examples in (16), repeated here:
(16) a. The price of shares is going up.
b. She got a high score on her exam.
This experience provides the basis for the conventional association between the concepts QUANTITY and VERTICAL ELEVATION.
9.4.4 Distinguishing primary and compound metaphors
Grady proposes that there are two types of conceptual metaphor: primary metaphor and compound metaphor. In this section, we examine how primary metaphor and compound metaphor are distinguished in Grady’s theory and how the two interact.
Primary metaphors relate two ‘simple’ concepts from distinct domains. In contrast, compound metaphors relate entire complex domains of experience, like THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. Figure 9.1, in which the small circles represent distinct concepts, illustrates the idea that primary metaphors link distinct concepts from distinct domains rather than linking entire domains. In contrast, because compound metaphors arise from more detailed and specific knowledge structure, they are more likely to be culture-dependent.













Figure 9.1 Primary metaphor

9.5 What is metonymy?
In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson pointed out that, in addition to metaphor, there is a related conceptual mechanism that is also central to human thought and language: conceptual metonymy.
Like metaphor, metonymy has traditionally been analysed as a trope: a purely linguistic device. However, Lakoff and Johnson argued that metonymy, like metaphor, was conceptual in
nature.
Lakoff and Johnson argued that, like metaphor, metonymy is a conceptual phenomenon, but one that has quite a distinct basis. Consider example (32).
(32) The ham sandwich has wandering hands.

Imagine that the sentence in (32) is uttered by one waitress to another in a café. This use of the expression ham sandwich represents an instance of metonymy: two entities are associated so that one entity (the item the customer ordered) stands for the other (the customer). As this example demonstrates, linguistic
metonymy is referential in nature: it relates to the use of expressions to ‘pinpoint’ entities in order to talk about them. This shows that metonymy functions differently from metaphor. For example (32) to be metaphorical we would need to understand ham sandwich not as an expression referring to the customer who ordered it, but in terms of a food item with human qualities.
On this interpretation, we would be attributing human qualities to a ham sandwich, motivated by the metaphor AN INANIMATE ENTITY IS AN AGENT. As these two quite distinct interpretations show, while metonymy is the conceptual relation ‘X stands for Y’, metaphor is the conceptual relation ‘X understood in terms of Y’.
Metonymies are represented by the formula ‘B for A’, where ‘B’ is the vehicle and ‘A’ is the target, e.g. PLACE FOR INSTITUTION. This contrasts with the ‘A is B’ formula that represents conceptual metaphor. For instance, in example (33)
Buckingham Palace is the vehicle (PLACE) which stands for the BRITISH MONARCHY, the target (INSTITUTION):
(33) Buckingham Palace denied the rumors.
This utterance is an example of the metonymy PLACE FOR INSTITUTION.
Figure 9.3 illustrates the distinction between conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy.

There are a number of distinct kinds of metonymy that have been identified in the cognitive semantics literature. We briefly illustrate some of these below.
In each of the following examples, the vehicle is italicized.
(34) PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT
a. I’ve just bought a new Citröen.
b. Pass me the Shakespeare on the top shelf.
c. She likes eating Burger King.
(35) PLACE FOR EVENT
a. Iraq nearly cost Tony Blair the premiership.
b. American public opinion fears another Vietnam.
c. Let’s hope that Beijing will be as successful an Olympics as Athens.


















Figure 9.3 Comparison between metaphor and metonymy

(36) PLACE FOR INSTITUTION
a. Downing street refused comment.
b. Paris and Washington are having a spat.
c. Europe has upped the stakes in the trade war with the
United States.
(37) PART FOR WHOLE
a. My wheels are parked out the back.
b. Lend me a hand.
c. She’s not just a pretty face.
(38) WHOLE FOR PART
a. England beat Australia in the 2003 rugby World Cup final.
b. The European Union has just passed new human rights legislation.
c. My car has developed a mechanical fault.
(39) EFFECT FOR CAUSE
a. He has a long face.
b. He has a spring in his step today.
c. Her face is beaming.
9.6 Conceptual metonymy
As we have seen, cognitive semanticists argue that metonymy, like conceptual metaphor, is not a purely linguistic device but is central to human thought.
9.6.1 Metonymy as an access mechanism
We noted above that Kövecses and Radden define metonymy in terms of the conceptual access it affords. This idea is based on proposals made by Langacker (1993: 30) who argues that ‘the entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as a reference point affording mental access to the desired target (that is, the entity actually being referred to)’. In other words, metonymy serves as point of access to a particular aspect of a domain and thus provides access to the target concept. Furthermore, each vehicle provides a different route into the relevant conceptual domain.
(41) a. Proust spent most of his time in bed.
b. Proust is tough to read.

9.6.2 Metonymy-producing relationships
The idea that metonymy provides access to (or highlights a particular aspect of) a domain matrix leads to two closely related questions. Firstly, what common patterns of access are there? Secondly, what are good vehicles for access? We address the first of these questions in this section, and the second of these questions in section 9.6.3. Our discussion is based on the study by Kövecses and Radden (1998).
They observe that there appear to be two main kinds of motivating relationships: (1) those relating to the part-whole organisation of a given domain (or domain matrix) so that parts (or substructures) of a domain represent the entire domain;
(2) those involving parts of a domain that stand for other parts. These are illustrated below with just a few examples taken from the extensive taxonomy provided by Kövecses and Radden.

Part-whole, whole-part relationships
(42) WHOLE THING FOR PART OF A THING
America for ‘United States’
(43) PART OF A THING FOR THE WHOLE THING
England for ‘United Kingdom’ [Kövecses and Radden 1998: 50]
(44) A CATEGORY FOR A MEMBER OF THE CATEGORY
The pill for ‘birth control pill’
(45) A MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY
Aspirin for ‘any pain-relieving tablet’ [Kövecses and Radden 1998: 53]
(46) INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION
to ski, to shampoo one’s hair
(47) AGENT FOR ACTION
to butcher the cow, to author a book
(48) ACTION FOR AGENT
snitch (slang: ‘to inform’ and ‘informer’)

(49) OBJECT INVOLVED IN THE ACTION FOR THE ACTION
to blanket the bed
(50) ACTION FOR OBJECT INVOLVED IN THE ACTION
Give me one bite
(51) RESULT FOR ACTION
a screw-up (slang: ‘to blunder’ and ‘blunder’)
(52) ACTION FOR RESULT
a deep cut
(53) MEANS FOR ACTION
He sneezed the tissue off the table.
(54) MANNER OF ACTION FOR THE ACTION
She tiptoed to her bed.
(55) TIME PERIOD OF ACTION FOR THE ACTION
to summer in Paris
(56) DESTINATION FOR MOTION
to porch the newspaper
(57) TIME OF MOTION FOR AN ENTITY INVOLVED IN THE MOTION
the 8.40 just arrived
9.6.3 Vehicles for metonymy
Kövecses and Radden (1998) propose a number of cognitive and communicative principles in order to account for the selection of a vehicle for metonymic relationships. In this section, we briefly present two of the cognitive principles:
(1) HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN; and (2) CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT. A central aspect of their explanation is that our anthropocentric perspective entails our tendency to privilege human and other humanly relevant entities and attributes
for metonymic vehicles. The HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN principle holds that human vehicles are preferred over non-human vehicles. Examples of metonymy that illustrate this principle include the following:
(58) CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED
Schwarzkopf defeated Iraq.
(59) PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT
He’s reading Shakespeare.
The CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT principle holds that concrete vehicles are preferred over abstract vehicles. This principle is illustrated by the following metonymic relationships:
(60) BODILY OVER ACTIONAL
hold your tongue (for ‘stop speaking’)
(61) BODILY FOR EMOTIONAL
heart (for ‘kindness’), e.g. He’s heartless
(62) BODILY OVER PERCEPTUAL
ear (for ‘hearing’), e.g. lend me your ear
(63) VISIBLE OVER INVISIBLE
to save one’s skin (for ‘to save one’s life’)


9.7 Metaphor-metonymy interaction
We have seen that metaphor and metonymy are viewed by cognitive linguists as conceptual processes that contribute to providing structure to the human conceptual system. According to this view, metaphor and metonymy as they appear in language are reflections of the organization of the underlying conceptual system. Given that metaphor and metonymy are both conceptual phenomena, and given that they may in principle both relate to the same conceptual domains, questions arise concerning the interaction of metaphor and metonymy within the conceptual system. We therefore conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the ways in which metaphor and metonymy interact.
Table 9.4 Constraints on possible vehicles in metonymy (Kövecses and Radden 1998)
Cognitive principles
Human experience
HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN
CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT
INTERACTIONAL OVER NON-INTERACTIONAL
FUNCTIONAL OVER NON-FUNCTIONAL
Perceptual selectivity
IMMEDIATE OVER NON-IMMEDIATE
OCCURRENT OVER NON-OCCURRENT
MORE OVER LESS
DOMINANT OVER LESS DOMINANT
GOOD GESTALT OVER POOR GESTALT
BOUNDED OVER UNBOUNDED
SPECIFIC OVER GENERIC
Cultural preferences
STEREOTYPICAL OVER NON-STEREOTYPICAL
IDEAL OVER NON-IDEAL
TYPICAL OVER NON-TYPICAL
CENTRAL OVER PERIPHERAL
BASIC OVER NON-BASIC
IMPORTANT OVER LESS IMPORTANT
COMMON OVER LESS COMMON
RARE OVER LESS RARE
Communicative principles
CLEAR OVER LESS CLEAR
RELEVANT OVER IRRELEVANT
Metaphtonymy
In an important article, Goossens (1990) presented an analysis of the way in which metaphor and metonymy interact. He calls this phenomenon metaphtonymy. Goossens identified a number of logically possible ways in which metaphor and metonymy could potentially interact; however, he found that only two of these logically possible interactions were commonly
attested.


The first way in which metaphor and metonymy interact is called metaphor from metonymy. In this form of interaction, a metaphor is grounded in a metonymic relationship. For example, the expression close-lipped can mean ‘silent’, which follows from metonymy: when one has one’s lips closed, one is (usually) silent, therefore to describe someone as close-lipped can stand
metonymically for silence. However, close-lipped can also mean ‘speaking but giving little away’. This interpretation is metaphoric, because we understand the absence of meaningful information in terms of silence. Goossens argues that the metaphoric interpretation has a metonymic basis in that it is only because being closed-lipped can stand for silence that the metaphoric reading is possible: thus metaphor from metonymy.
The second common form of interaction is called metonymy within metaphor. Consider the following example adapted from Goossens (1990):


(64) She caught the Prime Minister’s ear and persuaded him to accept her plan
This example is licensed by the metaphor ATTENTION IS A MOVING PHYSICAL ENTITY, according to which ATTENTION is understood as a MOVING ENTITY that has to be ‘caught’ (the minister’s ear). However, within this metaphor there is
also the metonymy EAR FOR ATTENTION, in which EAR is the body part that functions as the vehicle for the concept of ATTENTION in the metaphor. In this example, the metonym is ‘inside’ the metaphor.
The metonymic basis of metaphor
According to some cognitive semanticists (e.g. Barcelona 2003c; Taylor 2003), metonymy is an operation that may be more fundamental to the human conceptual system than metaphor. Barcelona (2003c: 31) goes so far as to suggest that ‘every metaphorical mapping presupposes a prior metonymic mapping.’


9.8 Summary
In this chapter we discussed two kinds of conceptual projection, conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy, both introduced by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in their development of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. As we have seen, cognitive linguists view metaphor and metonymy as more than superficial linguistic ‘devices’. According to the cognitive view, both these
operations are conceptual in nature. While metaphor maps structure from one domain onto another, metonymy is a mapping operation that highlights one entity by referring to another entity within the same domain (or domain matrix). In earlier versions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, metaphor was thought to be motivated by the need to provide relatively abstract target
domains with structure derived from more concrete source domains. More recently, the theory of primary metaphor has challenged this view, arguing that a foundational subset of conventional metaphors – primary metaphors – serve to link equally basic concepts at the cognitive level.

Exercises
9.1 Conceptual Metaphor Theory Summarise the key claims of Conceptual Metaphor Theory.
9.2 Identifying mappings
The following sentences are motivated by the metaphor TIME IS (MOTION ALONG) A PATH, which relates to the moving ego model that we introduced in Chapter 3. Following the model provided in Table 9.1, identify the set of mappings underlying these examples.
(a) We’re approaching Christmas.
(b) Graduation is still a long way away.
(c) Easter is ahead of us.
(d) We’ve left the summer behind us.
(e) When he was a boy he used to play football over the summer vacation.
Now he has to work.

9.3 Identifying metaphors
Identify the metaphors that underlie these examples. Identify possible source and target domains, and state the metaphor in the form ‘A is B’.
(a) That marriage is on the rocks.
(b) This once great country has become weaker over the years.
(c) In defending her point of view she took no prisoners.
(d) Those two are still quite close.
(e) We’ve got a big day ahead of us tomorrow.
(f) A different species is going extinct everyday.
9.4 Primary vs. compound metaphors
For the metaphors you identified in exercise 9.3, determine whether these are likely to be examples of primary or compound metaphor. In view of the discussion in section 9.4, explain your reasoning for each example.
9.5. Correlation vs. resemblance-based metaphors
Consider the following examples. Explain how the metaphors that underlie them illustrate the distinction between metaphors motivated by correlation versus metaphors motivated by perceived resemblance:
(a) My boss is a real pussycat.
(b) So far, things are going smoothly for the Liberal Democrats in the election campaign.
9.6 Metaphor vs. metonymy
Describe the main differences between conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy, and explain how the function of each type of conceptual projection differs.
9.7 Identifying metonymies
Identify the conceptual metonymies that underlie each of the following examples. For each example, identify the vehicle and the target, and explain how you reached your conclusions.
(a) George Bush arrested Saddam Hussein.
(b) The White House is refusing to talk to the Elysée Palace these days
while the Kremlin is talking to everyone.
(c) Watergate continues to have a lasting impact on American politics.
(d) She loves Picasso.
(e) The restaurant refused to serve the couple as they weren’t properly dressed.
(f) She xeroxed the page.
(g) Jane has a long face.
(h) She’s not just a pretty face.
(i) All hands on deck!

9.8. Textual analysis
Select an excerpt from a newspaper or magazine article. Analyze the excerpt with respect to conceptual metaphor and metonymy. Identify the source/vehicle and target in each case, and explain your reasoning. Below are some examples of the sorts of texts you might consider selecting:
(a) an article from a woman’s interest magazine relating to make-up and beauty products;
(b) an example from a men’s magazine dealing with health and/or fitness;
(c) an article from a newspaper relating to sports coverage, such as rivalry between football teams or their managers;
(d) an article from a newspaper’s ‘opinion/comment’ page(s), dealing with a current political controversy;
(e) an excerpt from an agony-aunt column dealing with relationships;
(f) a pop-song lyric dealing with love;
(g) slogans or text from advertisements that appear in newspapers or magazines.
Good luck!