INTRODUCTION TO
COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS
TRUONG VAN ANH
SAIGON UNIVERSITY
UNIT 3: Universals and variation in language, thought and experience
Mention some semantic primes or primitives: semantic decomposition or componential analysis approach.
Some of the primitives Jackendoff proposes are [THING], [PLACE], [DIRECTION], [ACTION], [EVENT], [MANNER] and [AMOUNT]. These ontological categories can be encoded in language. For instance, each of these corresponds to a wh-question word, such as what, who, when and so on.
(4) What did you buy?
A fish [THING]
(5) Where is my coat?
On the coat hook [PLACE]
(6) Where did they go?
Into the garden [DIRECTION]
(7) What did you do?
went to the cinema [ACTION]
(8) What happened next?
The toy fell out of the window [EVENT]
(9) How did you cook the eggs?
Slowly [MANNER]
(10) How long was the fish?
Over a meter (long) [AMOUNT]
In addition to primitive ontological categories, the relations that hold between them are also primitives. Consider example (11).
(11) The statue is in the park.
The THEME of the sentence (what the sentence is about) is a particular [THING], lexicalized by the expression the statue. Moreover, the statue is located with respect to a particular [LOCATION].
Abstract states can also be structured in terms of the [PLACE-FUNCTION] relation, even though abstract states such as TROUBLE or LOVE cannot be construed as locations:
(12) a. John is in trouble.
b. John is in love.
According to Jackendoff’s theory, the reason that the [PLACE-FUNCTION] relation can be applied to abstract states such as TROUBLE and LOVE is because these more abstract concepts are being structured in terms of more primitive ontological categories.
How many Gestalt principles?
Perception: figure-ground segregation
Human perception appears to automatically segregate any given scene into figure-ground organisation.
Perception: principle of proximity
This principle holds that elements in a scene that are closer together will be seen as belonging together in a group. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The consequence of the greater proximity of the dots on the vertical axis than on the horizontal axis means that we perceive the dots in this image as being organized into columns rather than rows.
Perception: principle of similarity
This principle holds that entities in a scene that share visual characteristics such as size, shape or color will be perceived as belonging together in a group.
Perception: principle of closure
This principle holds that incomplete figures are often completed by the perceptual system, even when part of the perceptual information is missing. For instance, in Figure 3.5, we perceive a white triangle overlaid on three black circles, even though the image could simply represent three incomplete circles.
Perception: principle of continuity
This principle holds that human perception has a preference for continuous figures. This is illustrated in Figure 3.6. Here, we perceive two unbroken rectangles, one passing behind another, even though this is not what we actually see. In fact, the shaded rectangle is obscured by the first, so we have no direct
evidence that the shaded area represents one continuous rectangle rather than two separate ones.

Perception: principle of smallness
Finally, we consider the principle of smallness. This states that smaller entities tend to be more readily perceived as figures than larger entities. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.7.



Figure-ground segregation
the ground = reference object.
Sentences in which the reference object precedes the preposition, although grammatically well-formed, are semantically odd (indicated by the question mark preceding the sentence):
(13) a. The bike is near [the house].
b. ?[The house] is near the bike
The semantic ‘oddness’ of this example can be explained by the fact that the reference object is typically the immovable entity that only serves to locate the figure. Recall that the Gestalt principle of smallness predicts that the smaller entity (the bike) will be perceived as the figure.
Primary and secondary reference object
There are two terms primary reference object and secondary reference object. While the primary reference object is usually explicitly encoded by a lexical item, the secondary reference object need not be, but can instead merely be implied.
(14) Big Ben is north of the River Thames.
While the River Thames is the primary reference object, the secondary reference object, the Earth, is implied by the spatial expression north of. Talmy (2000) identifies
two kinds of secondary reference object: encompassing and external.
A similar example is the concept QUEUE, which has asymmetric, front–back orientation:
(15) Jane is ahead of Mary in the queue/line for ice cream.
In example (15), the queue provides an orientational frame that encompasses the primary reference object Mary, which in turn locates the figure Jane. Observe that it is because of the front–back orientation imposed by the secondary reference object that Jane’s location with respect to the primary reference object, Mary, is established. After all, Mary could be facing away from the front of the queue to talk to somebody behind her. Even in this situation, it would still be possible to describe Jane as ahead of Mary (in the queue).
Relative proximity: contact
The figure can be in physical contact with the reference object:
(16) a. The mosaic is on the front of the church.
b. The mosaic is on the back of the church.
c. The mosaic is on the (right/left-hand) side of the church.
Relative proximity: adjacency
The figure can be adjacent to, but not in contact with, the reference object:
(17) a. The bike is in front of the church.
b. The bike is behind the church.
c. The bike is on one side of/beside the church.
d. The bike is on the right/left of the church.

Relative proximity: at some distance
The figure can be at some remove from the reference object:
(18) a. The bike is to the left/right of the church.
b. The bike is a way off from the front/rear of the church.



Reference frames
The third parameter for delineating a spatial scene, as evident in the languages of the world, is the reference frame. Reference frames represent the means
language has at its disposal for using reference objects in order to locate figures.
Primary reference object alone: a ground-based reference frame.
Secondary reference object includes
three reference frames of this kind: field-based, guidepost-based and projector-based.
Primary reference object is abbreviated to PRO, and secondary reference object to SRO.

Reference frames: ground-based
(19) The grocery store is next to the office building.
This type of reference frame is ground-based, illustrated in Figure 3.10. The large cross in Figure 3.10, which overlays the office building, indicates that it is the office building that is providing the frame of reference for locating the figure.
Reference frames: field-based
(20) The grocery store is to the west of the office building.
Like the remaining reference frames, the field-based type involves a secondary reference object. Field-based reference is characterized by an encompassing secondary reference object, like the Earth example we discussed earlier. A similar example of field-based reference is given in (20) and illustrated in Figure 3.11.
The crossed-lines indicate the cardinal points (north, south, east and west) that take their reference from the Earth.
Reference frames: guidepost-based
(21) The grocery store is on the tower side of the office building. Like the field-based type, guidepost-based reference framing involves a secondary reference object. However, this type involves an external rather
than encompassing secondary reference object. In the guidepost-based reference frame, the external secondary reference object is a non-animate entity –
the tower in example (21) – which is external to the primary reference object.


Reference frames: projector-based
(22) The grocery store is to the left of the office building.
The final kind of reference frame also involves an external secondary reference object. In this type of reference frame, the secondary reference object is an
animate entity (here, the speaker), whose location serves as a frame of reference in locating the relevant part of the primary reference object that enables the
figure to be located. In example (19), ‘left’ refers to that side of the office building from the perspective of the speaker. This type of reference frame is called
‘projector-based’ because the speaker is projecting his or her own location as a frame of reference. Example (22) is illustrated in Figure 3.13.
3.2.2 Patterns in the conceptualization of time
Lexical concepts for TIME
Primary lexical concepts and secondary lexical concepts.
Primary lexical concepts are those that relate to common aspects of human cognitive processing. we mention: duration, simultaneity, temporal ‘point’ or moment, ‘now’ and so on. In contrast, secondary lexical concepts are cultural constructs and thus may often be culture specific.
The lexical concepts we will address are DURATION, MOMENT, EVENT and INSTANCE.



Lexical concept: DURATION
The concept of DURATION has two variants that relate to two distinct subjective experiences. The first is called protracted duration and relates to the experience that time is proceeding more slowly than usual:
(23) Time drags when you have nothing to do.
(24) My first thought was, ‘Where did that car come from?’ Then I said to myself, ‘Hit the brakes.’. . .I saw her look at me through the open window, and turn the wheel, hand over hand, toward the right.
The second variant of DURATION is called temporal compression. This is when we experience time proceeding more quickly than usual.
(25) The time has sped/whizzed by.
(26) Where has the time gone?
(27) ‘Time flies when you’re having fun’.

Lexical concept: MOMENT
Another aspect of our temporal experience is the ability to assess time in terms of discrete moments. This experience is also reflected in language. Consider examples (28)–(29).
(28) The time for a decision has come.
(29) Now is the time to address irreversible environmental decay.
Each of the uses of time in these examples could be paraphrased by the expression moment. In these examples, TIME is conceptualized not in terms of an interval, whose duration can be assessed, but instead as a discrete point.
Lexical concept: EVENT
A third conceptualisation of TIME relates to the notion of an EVENT. This is an occurrence of some kind. Events derive, at the perceptual level, from temporal processing, which binds particular occurrences into a temporally framed unity: a ‘window’ or ‘time slot’.
(30) With the first contraction, the young woman knew her time had come.
(31) The man had every caution given him not a minute before to be careful with the gun, but his time was come as his poor shipmates say and with that they console themselves.
In each of these examples a particular event, childbirth and death respectively, is lexicalized by time. This suggests that the conceptualization of an event is closely tied up with temporal experience.
Lexical concept: INSTANCE
The final temporal lexical concept we will consider is INSTANCE. This concept underlies the fact that temporal events can be enumerated, which entails that
distinct events can be seen as instances or examples of the ‘same’ event.
(32) With that 100m race the sprinter had improved for the fourth time in the same season.
In this example, time refers not to four distinct moments, but to a fourth instance of the ‘improvement’ event. This example provides linguistic evidence that separate temporal events can be related to one another and ‘counted’ as distinct instances of a single event type.


Temporal aspects of an event: Christmas
Now let’s consider a word other than time which also exhibits these distinct aspects of temporal experience. Consider the word Christmas. This relates to a
particular kind of temporal event: the kind that is framed (or understood) with respect to the calendar.
(33) Protracted DURATION Christmas seemed to drag this year.
Equally, Christmas can appear to be proceeding more quickly than usual:
(34) Temporal compression
Christmas sped by this year.
Example (35) shows that Christmas can be conceptualized in terms of discrete moments or ‘points’ of time:
(35) MOMENT
Christmas has finally arrived/is here.
Finally, example (36) shows that instances of Christmas can be counted and compared with one another:
(36) INSTANCE
This Christmas was better than last Christmas.
The elaboration of temporal lexical concepts

Consider examples (37)–(40).
(37) Mandarin (examples from Yu 1998)

(38) Japanese (examples from Shinohara 1999)

In English, protracted duration can only be elaborated in terms of motion events that involve slow motion or absence of motion:
(41) a. Time seemed to stand still.
b. The time dragged.
Temporal compression, on the other hand, is elaborated in terms of rapid motion (42a), or motion that is so rapid as to be imperceptible (42b):
(42) a. The time flew/sped/whizzed by.
b. The time has vanished/disappeared.
Both these kinds of elaboration contrast with the way in which the lexical concepts EVENT and MOMENT are structured.


(43) MOMENT
The time for a decision is approaching/coming/getting closer/has arrived.
(44) EVENT
The young woman’s time is approaching/coming/getting closer/has arrived.

Crosslinguistic evidence suggests that there are three main cognitive models for TIME.
Cognitive model: moving time
In this model, there is an experiencer, who may either be implicit or linguistically coded by expressions like I. The experiencer is called the ego, whose location
represents the experience of ‘now’.
Linguistic evidence for this cognitive model comes from examples like those in (45), in which the passage of time is understood in terms of the motion of a temporal entity towards the ego:
(45) a. Christmas is getting closer.
b. My favourite part of the piece is coming up.
c. The deadline has passed.

Cognitive model: moving ego
The ego’s motion is represented by the direction of the arrow. As with the Figure 3.16, the ego is unmarked for
orientation.
(46) a. We’re moving towards Christmas.
b. We’re approaching my favorite part of the piece.
c. She’s passed the deadline.
d. We’ll have an answer within two weeks.
e. The meetings were spread out over a month.
In these examples TIME is conceptualized as a stationary location or bounded region in space.
Cognitive model: temporal sequence
The third model relates to the concepts EARLIER and LATER. Unlike the previous two models, this one does not involve an ego. Instead, a temporal event is understood relative to another earlier or later temporal event. The model is illustrated in Figure 3.18, and linguistic examples are given in (47).
(47) a. Monday precedes Tuesday.
b. Tuesday follows Monday.
In these English examples, LATER follows EARLIER: the earlier event, Monday, is understood as being located in front of the later event, Tuesday. In other words, it is relative to Tuesday rather than the ego (the subjective experience of ‘now’) that Monday is EARLIER. Figure 3.18 captures this as directionality is signalled by the arrow.
Earlier events (events are represented by the small
circles) are understood as being located in front of later events.
Time-based versus ego-based models Distinguishing ego-based models from time-based models resolves a puzzling fact in English. Consider the following examples:
(48) a. in the weeks ahead of us
b. That’s all behind us now.
(49) a. in the following weeks
b. in the preceding weeks

In (48), events relating to the future are conceptualized as being ahead and events relating to the past as being behind.
3.3 Cross-linguistic variation in semantic systems
3.3.1 Variation in the conceptualization of space
Categorising spatial scenes in English and Korean
Consider the spatial scenes described in (50) and (51), represented in Figure 3.19.
(50) a. put cup on table
b. put magnet on refrigerator
c. put hat on
d. put ring on finger
e. put top on pen
f. put lego block on lego stack
(51) a. put video cassette in case
b. put book in case
c. put piece in puzzle
d. put apple in bowl
e. put book in bag
This is achieved using the four different Korean verbs in (52):
(52) a. nohta ‘put on horizontal surface’
b. pwuchita ‘juxtapose surfaces’
c. ssuta ‘put clothing on head’
d. kkita ‘interlock/fit tightly’
Examples (53)–(56) show which Korean verb corresponds to which of the spatial scenes described using the English expression put on.
(53) nohta ‘put on horizontal surface’
eg. Put cup on table
(54) pwuchita “juxtapose surfaces”
eg. Put magnet on refrigerator
(55) Ssuta “put clothing on head”
eg. Put hat on
(56) Kkita “interlock/ fit tightly”
eg. a. put ring on finger
b. put top on pen
c. put lego lock on lego stack
Similarly, the English examples in (51), involving the expression put in, are categorised into spatial scenes of two different kinds. This is achieved using the two
Korean verbs in (57). Observe that the verb kkita appears for the second time.
(57) a. kkita ‘interlock/fit tightly’
b. nehta ‘put loosely in or around’




The examples in (58) and (59) show which Korean verb corresponds to which of the spatial scenes described using the English expression put in.
(58) kkita ‘interlock/fit tightly’
e.g. a. put video cassette in case
b. put book in case
c. put piece in puzzle
(59) nehta ‘put loosely in or around’
e.g. a. put apple in bowl
b. put book in bag

The way Korean categorizes the scenes we described in (50) and (51) is represented in Figure 3.20, which contrasts with the English model in Figure 3.19.

3.3.2 Variation in the conceptualization of time
In this section we consider two languages that conceptualize time in very different ways from English: Aymara and Mandarin.
The past and future in Aymara is an indigenous language of South America, spoken in the Andean region of Peru, Chile and Bolivia. There is good linguistic and gestural evidence that while Aymara features variants of both ego-based and time-based cognitive models for time, in the ego-based model, Aymara speakers conceptualise the FUTURE as being located behind the ego, while PAST is conceptualised as being in front of the ego. This pattern of elaboration contrasts with the English pattern. Consider example (60).




(60) a. The future lies in front of us.
b. She has a bright future ahead/in front of her.
These examples show that the lexical concept FUTURE is structured in terms of locations in front of the ego. This is also true of other future-oriented lexical concepts, as (61) illustrates.
(61) a. Old age lies way ahead of him.
b. Having children is in front of us.
c. The years ahead of us will be difficult.
Compare the representation of PAST in English:
(62) The past is behind me.

This example shows that the lexical concept PAST is elaborated in terms of a location behind the ego. This pattern is extended to all past-oriented lexical concepts:
(63) a. My childhood is behind me.
b. Once divorced, she was finally able to put an unhappy marriage behind her.
Now compare the way PAST and FUTURE are conceptualised in Aymara.
The Aymaran expressions for PAST and FUTURE are given in (64) and (65), respectively.
(64) Mayra pacha
front/eye/sight time
“past time”
(65) q’ipa pacha
back/behind time
“future time”

Future Past
Earlier and later in Mandarin
We now briefly consider how the temporal concepts EARLIER and LATER are conceptualised in Mandarin. Again we find a contrast with the English pattern that we discussed earlier, where concepts relating to the distinction between EARLIER and LATER are elaborated in terms of their relative location on the horizontal axis. The following examples illustrate this pattern, where EARLIER is ‘before’ and LATER is ‘after’. Recall Figure 3.18, which shows how LATER follows EARLIER in this model of TIME.
(66) a. Tuesday comes/is before Wednesday.
b. Wednesday comes/is after Tuesday.
In Mandarin there is a pattern in which the vertical axis elaborates the distinction between EARLIER and LATER. Concepts that are earlier (experienced first) are conceptualised as ‘higher’ or ‘upper’, while concepts that are later (experienced subsequent to the first) are conceptualised as ‘lower’. Examples
(67)–(71) from Yu (1998) illustrate this pattern.

(67) a. shang-ban-tian
upper-half-day
‘morning’
b. shang-ban-tian
lower-half-day
‘afternoon
(68) a. shang-ban-ye
upper-half-night
‘before midnight’
b. xia-ban-ye
lower-half-night ‘after midnight’





Figure 3.22 The slope model (adapted from Shinohara 2000: 5)
(69) a. shang-ban-yue
upper-half-month
‘the first half of the month’
b. xia-ban-yue
lower-half-month
‘the second half of the month’
(70) a. shang-ban-nian
upper-half-year
‘the first half of the year’
b. xia-ban-nian
lower-half-year
‘the second half of the year’
(71) a. shang-bei
upper-generation
‘the elder generation’
b. xia-bei
lower-generation
‘the younger generation’
According to Shinohara (2000) the motivation for this pattern of elaboration may be due to how we experience slopes. When an object is rolled down a slope, the earlier part of the event is at the top of the slope, while due to the force of gravity the later part of the event is lower down. This idea is represented in
Figure 3.22.


3.4 Linguistic relativity and cognitive linguistics
In this final section, we turn to the issue of linguistic relativity. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis consists of two parts: linguistic determinism (the idea that language determines non-linguistic thought) and linguistic relativity (the idea that speakers of different languages will therefore think differently).
3.4.1 Whorf and the Linguistic Relativity Principle
3.4.2 Language as a shaper of thought
Language facilitates conceptualization
3.4.3 The cognitive linguistics position




3.5 Summary
Linguists of any theoretical persuasion are intrigued by the possible existence of linguistic universals, by the form of such universals and by the nature of the relationship between thought and language. In this chapter, we began by comparing the cognitive and formal positions on linguistic universals. While formal linguists have tended to treat universals as resulting from primitive concepts or mechanisms, innately given, cognitive linguists argue instead that there are universal tendencies. We explored the cognitive view in more detail, and outlined a number of constraints on human conceptualization that go some way to explaining the existence of linguistic universals. These constraints include the nature of human embodiment, Gestalt principles and the nature of human categorization, all of which collectively constitute a conceptualizing capacity common to all humans.


We then presented some examples of common
cross-linguistic patterns in the conceptualization of the fundamental domains of space and time. In the domain of SPACE we suggested that there are three common cross-linguistic patterns in terms of how languages structure space.
These include (1) figure-ground segregation; (2) a means of encoding the relative proximity of the figure with respect to the ground; and (3) a means of encoding the location of the figure with respect to the ground. This is achieved by the employment of a particular reference frame. In the domain of TIME,
cross-linguistic patterns relate to a small set of primary lexical concepts for time, and three large-scale cognitive models for time, which integrate these (and other) temporal lexical concepts together with their patterns of elaboration (conventional patterns of imagery). We then presented some examples of
cross-linguistic variation in the conceptualization of space and time, which demonstrate that despite some fundamental


cross-linguistic similarities in the linguistic representation of space and time, there is nevertheless considerable cross-linguistic variation. Finally, having explored the issue of linguistic universals, we introduced the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: the idea that language might play some role in determining non-linguistic thought, and that speakers of different languages might therefore have different conceptual systems. We concluded that, while the strong version of this hypothesis is rejected by most linguists, there is some evidence in favor of the weak version of the hypothesis. Although cognitive linguistics makes the case for a common conceptualizing capacity, accounting for general cross-linguistic patterns, such a position is nevertheless consistent with and even predicts substantial cross-linguistic variation. Given that the linguistic system both reflects the conceptualizing capacity, and in turn influences the nature of knowledge by virtue of the
language-specific categories it derives, cognitive linguistics is consistent with a weak version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.
Exercises
3.1 Cognitive linguistics vs. formal linguistics
How does cognitive linguistics differ from formalist approaches in terms of its approach to universals? Summarise the key points of each position. Is there any shared ground?
3.2 The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
Summarise the cognitive linguistics position with respect to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. What is the evidence for this position?

3.3 Space: reference frames
Classify the following examples based on the taxonomy of reference frames provided in section 3.2. Give your reasoning for each, and provide as much detail as possible.
(a) St Paul’s cathedral is to the south of the Thames.
(b) St Paul’s is left of the Thames.
(c) St Paul’s is on the Bank of England side of the Thames.
(d) St Paul’s is in the City of London.
(e) St Paul’s is near the London Monument.


3.4 Time
Consider the following examples:
(a) Time passed.
(b) Christmas has vanished.
(c) We’ve got through the most difficult period of the project.
(d) They have a lot of important decisions coming up.
(e) The general meeting came after we made the decision to liquidate all assets.
(f) The top premiership clubs have three games in the space of five days.
In view of the discussion of the lexical concepts and three cognitive models for TIME presented in this chapter (section 3.2.2), identify which cognitive model each of these utterances is most likely to be motivated by. What problems did you have in identifying the relevant cognitive model? How might these problems be resolved?
3.5 Time: Wolof
Wolof has a number of words that relate to some of the lexical concepts for time found in English. For instance, dirr corresponds to the English DURATION concept lexicalised by time. In the following examples (drawn from Moore 2000) we’ll consider the Wolof word jot (‘time’). The examples suggest that jot is comparable to the English concept of COMMODITY, in which time is conceptualised as a resource that can be possessed, bought or wasted (e.g. I have all the time in the world).
(a) Dama nàkk jot rekk
SFOC.1 lack time only
“It’s just that I don’t have time!”
(b) Q: Am nga jot
have PERF.2 time
“Do you have (any) time?”
A: Fi ma tolu dama nàkk jot
where 1.SUBJ be.at.a.point.equivalent.to SFROC.1 lack time
“At this point I don’t have (any) time.”


(c) Su nu am-ee jot nu saafal la
When we have-ANT time we roast.BEN 2.OBJ
‘When we have time we will roast [peanuts] for you.’

However, unlike the English concept COMMODITY as lexicalised by time, jot cannot be transferred to another person (e.g. can you give/spare me some time?), nor can it be made, wasted or spent (e.g. we’ve made/wasted/spent some time for/on each other). What does this imply regarding the similarities and differences between the English COMMODITY concept associated with time, and the lexical concept for COMMODITY encoded in Wolof by the word jot? What might this suggest about how Wolof and English speakers conceptualize time as a resource or commodity? In view of this, is it appropriate to label the meaning associated with jot COMMODITY, or can you think of another more appropriate term?
3.6 Kay and Kempton’s color naming experiment
Kay and Kempton (1984) compared English speakers with Tarahumara (Mexican Indian) speakers on naming triads of color (blue, blue-green, green). Tarahumara has a word for ‘blue-green’, but not separate words for ‘blue’ and ‘green’. The task was to state whether blue-green color was closer to blue or green. English speakers sharply distinguished blue and green, but Tarahumara speakers did not. In a subsequent study, English speakers were induced to call the intermediate colors blue-green, and the effect disappeared. How might we
interpret these findings in the light of the ideas discussed in this chapter?
Good luck!